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.] can never legitimately be applied to the situation of a singly country which is part of an international economic system, and that any attempt to do so is likely in the long run and for the world as a whole to be an additional source of instability."
(Friedrich August von Hayek 1937: 93) Since the mid 1980s the global monetary system has suffered from a swelling wave of wandering bubbles, which has cumulated into a series of crisis events and excessive monetary easing (Schnabl and Hofmann 2008) . Whereas monetary easing has originated in the large industrial countries with independent central banks, boom-and-bust periods have emerged both in the industrialized and emerging world. Given that monetary policy rates in the industrialized countries have approached the zero bound and rising government debt levels herald further pressure on central banks towards monetizing government debt, doubts concerning the sustainability of the current world monetary system -which is based on fiat money and the discretionary use of monetary policy for business cycle stabilization -are growing (Selgin, Lastrapes, White 2012 , Polleit 2011 .
Although there can be few doubt that given the current scope of monetary expansion, price, financial, economic and political stability are at risk, very few action has been taken towards monetary policy reform so far. Policy makers, central bankers and economists seem absorbed by day-to-day crisis management rather than reflecting on the roots of financial fragility and crisis. The imminent threat of financial meltdown and rising unemployment is argued to make further monetary easing pressing with monetary policy success being regarded to be ensured by moderate consumer price inflation (Bernanke 2011, Draghi and Constâncio 2012) .
To create a basis for the discussion of monetary policy reform the paper uses the Austrian monetary business cycle theories as put forward by Wicksell (1898) , Mises (1912) , Hayek (1929) as a theoretical framework. This allows to identify monetary policy mistakes in form of "benign neglect" towards monetary policy reform, which is argued to have led into a vicious circle of financial crisis and monetary expansion, and therefore into what will be dubbed low interest rate and high government debt trap. To identify the appropriate toehold for monetary policy reform the stability of non-exit equilibria and monetary policy based redistribution chains in favour of the current world monetary hegemon are derived. To solve the current dilemma of a hysteresis of a low interest rate and high government debt environment currency competition between dollar and euro with China as a referee is proposed.
The Failure of Monetary Policy Rules and the Supremacy of Keynes over Hayek
Since the mid 1980s starting with a too loose monetary policy in Japan the world has experienced a pendulum of monetary expansion and financial market boom and bust (Schnabl and Hoffmann 2008) . The outcome has been an unprecedented scope of crisis, triggered by an unprecedented scale of monetary expansion, which has been justified by contained consumer price inflation.
The monetary overinvestment 1 theories by Wicksell (1898) , Mises (1912 ), Hayek (1929 provide a valuable framework to understand the interaction dynamics between monetary expansion, boom and bust on financial markets and benign neglect towards monetary policy reform. Given a higher weight of financial markets for economic activity, goods market based monetary rules, which were originally designed to depoliticise monetary policy, became the gateway towards a revival of Keynesian macroeconomic fine-tuning based on monetary policy.
Monetary Policy Failure from a Wicksell-Hayek-Mises Perspective
Although the monetary overinvestment theories by Wicksell (1898) , Hayek (1929) and Mises (1912) were designed to model real business cycles -with the impact on financial markets only playing a second-order role -they provide a useful starting point to understand the most recent boom-and-bust in financial markets and failure of monetary reform. Whereas, in the seminal overinvestment theories undue monetary expansion triggers (real) investment booms, which are followed by rising consumption, inflation and rising stock market prices, nowadays financial market booms (preferably in stock und real estate markets) are followed by consumption and investment booms. The move into recessions is triggered by financial market crisis rather than by rising inflation as in the seminal overinvestment theories.
To describe a Wickell-Hayek-Mises-type overinvestment boom four interest rates are distinguished. First, the internal interest rate is assumed to reflect the expected returns of investment projects. Second, the natural interest rate is defined to balance supply (saving) and demand (investment) on domestic capital markets (I=S). Third, the central bank interest rate is the policy rate set by the central bank. It represents the interest rate, which commercial banks are charged by the central bank for refinancing operations. Forth, the capital market
interest rate is defined as the interest rate set by the private banking (financial) sector for credit provided to private enterprises (Hoffmann and Schnabl, 2011a) . Following the interest rate concept of Wicksell (1898) , Mises (1912) and Hayek (1929 Hayek ( , 1935 , the saving-investment decisions in an economy are in equilibrium, when the natural rate of interest is equal to the central bank and capital market interest rate.
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An upswing in a closed economy starts, for instance, because positive expectations due to real or financial innovation (Schumpeter, 1911; Hayek, 1929) increase the internal interest rate of investment. Given rising investment the natural rate of interest increases. In the endogenous business cycle models of Mises (1912) and Hayek (1929; 1935) a credit and overinvestment cycle emerges as the central bank keeps the policy rate constant during the upswing allowing for too easy refinancing conditions. Alternatively, because of competition for market shares, commercial banks hold capital market rates low by expanding credit lines (Hayek, 1929) . Additional investment projects with lower marginal efficiency are financed which are not backed by rising saving, as the interest rate remains low. An unsustainable disequilibrium between saving and investment is constituted.
According to Hayek (1935) excessive lending at constant capital market rates during the upswing distorts the production structure of the economy. As capital market rates stay low despite higher investment, the credit expansion falsely signals to investors that saving (preferences of households to forgo present consumption) has increased. With consumption being expected to decline in the present and to increase in the future, high future returns on investment of capital goods (goods aimed at producing future consumer goods) are expected.
Unemployed capacities and labour are drawn into the production of investment goods. More consumption is induced by rising employment, wages and income. The demand for consumer goods rises as well, providing an incentive to further increase capacities (Garrison, 2004) . Usually, the capital market interest rate is assumed to follow the central bank interest rate. For the (temporary) divergence of capital market interest rates and central bank interest rates during crisis see Hoffmann and Schnabl (2011b) .
The positive expectations can be transmitted to the asset markets where speculation may set in. According to Schumpeter (1911, 237) price expectations of stocks and other real assets can be disconnected from the real economic development. A speculative mania may emerge, in which speculative price projections set in and "the symptoms of prosperity themselves finally become, in the well known manner, a factor of prosperity" (Schumpeter 1911, 226) .
Investment and consumption can co-move upwards as long as there are unemployed workforce and idle capacities. At some point, labor becomes scarce and capacity limits are reached. Resources are bound in the capital goods sectors, whereas the consumption goods sector is unable to satisfy increasing demand. The over-employment of capital and labour cannot be sustained to keep up the production level. Consumer price inflation accelerates. The central bank increases the interest rate to fight inflation (Mises, 1912; Hayek, 1929; 1935) and/or commercial banks reassess the credit risk. Investment projects turn unprofitable and cannot be finished due to scarce resources (Hayek, 1935) . Central bank policy rates and capital market rates rise and credit is restricted.
The boom turns into bust. Investment projects with an internal interest rate below the increased interest rate have to be dismantled. Asset prices burst, which worsens the equity positions and credit worthiness of firms. Investment falls further, which pulls the natural interest rate below the central bank and/or the capital market rate. A saving overhang emerges because saving is more lucrative at relatively higher interest rates while investment is less profitable. This leads to further disinvestment. Production declines, unemployment rises and wages fall. Due to falling consumption (at higher interest rates), prices start to deflate. As the central bank and/or commercial banks hold the interest rate above the natural interest rate, the downturn is amplified.
The Natural Interest Rate and Monetary Policy Rules
Although the Austrian business cycle theories aimed to model real business cycles, they can be used as a framework for classifying and identifying monetary policy mistakes. Based on the Austrian concept of the natural interest rate -which balances saving and investment -two types of monetary policy mistakes can be defined.
First, during an economic upswing the central bank keeps the interest rate below the natural interest rate (for too long) (monetary policy mistake of type 1). This triggers an overinvestment boom as described above which inevitably leads into crisis and recession.
Second, during recessions the central bank keeps the central bank rate above the natural interest rate (for too long), thereby aggravating the downturn (monetary policy mistake of type 2).
The policy implication arising from the monetary overinvestment theories is that central banks should keep central bank rates close to the natural interest rate both in boom and recession to smooth business cycles (Hayek 1929) . Although the natural interest rate remains a theoretical concept and therefore unknown to policy makers, it should be the task of central banks to gain sufficient information to keep the central bank rate close to the natural interest rate. In this spirit, Taylor (1993) provided an inflation-targeting rule. It aims to isolate independent central banks from producing Philips-curve type short-term employment effects (Kydland / Prescott 1977) . White (2010) characterizes such a constitutional constraint on monetary policy !"#$%&'"&'(%)*$'+,'*"-.'%"/0$% than "rule by authorities".
However, since the 1990s inflation targeting regimes as frameworks to contain inflationary pressure and economic stability failed for two reasons. First, given the fall of the iron curtain and the integration of a large set of low wage countries (in particular China) into the world economy, money supply in large industrial countries could grow without any visible impact on domestic consumer price inflation (Hoffmann and Schnabl 2011b In the large countries issuing the large international currencies these loop ways are particularly extended, as they take their ways through fast growing emerging market economies (Hoffmann and Schnabl 2011b) . Second, the fast growth of emerging markets and financial markets allowed for persistently low consumer price inflation due to an asymmetric attitude towards monetary policy mistakes of type 1 and type 2. The monetary policies as observed since the mid 1980s
in the large countries (Japan, US, Germany/euro area) became mainly subject to a monetary policy mistake of type 1: Interest rates set by central banks tended to be kept too low for too long during economic upswings, in the US after 2001 under Alan Greenspan for instance below the Taylor (1993) target. In contrast, during recessions central banks tended to slash interest rate immediately to avoid the monetary policy mistakes of type 2.
Keynes' Supremacy over Hayek
The consequence for money supply growth became widely ignored.
The Global Move into the Low Interest Rate and High Debt Trap
Since the monetary counter revolution of the early 1980s, which marked the return towards a high weight of price stability for monetary policy, interest rate levels in the large industrial countries (Japan, US, Germany/euro area) gradually declined towards zero. Whereas in the US and the euro area the exit from the zero / historical low interest rate policy remains to be perceived to be only temporarily postponed, the zero interest rate policy in Japan persists since 1999 (Krugman 2012) . It will be shown how the structural decline of monetary policy rates below the natural interest rate -and the resulting erosion of the signalling and allocation function of the interest rate -interacted with fiscal policy to further postpone monetary policy reform.
The Global Structural Decline of Interest Rates
The structural decline of both the nominal and real world interest levels began in Japan in the mid 1980s, driven by an asymmetric exchange rate policy. Because the dynamic export sector is the main pillar of growth, yen appreciation constitutes a painful drag on growth. Japanese monetary authorities intervened in foreign exchange markets in times of yen appreciation to soften appreciation pressure, whereas they remained widely inactive when the yen depreciated.
Given this asymmetric intervention pattern, the Japanese foreign exchange reserves rose to by then unprecedented levels. Although Japanese foreign currency purchases were sterilized in the first place to neutralize effects on domestic monetary conditions, interest rates fell during appreciation phases more than thay were raised during yen depreciation phases. As a result Japanese short-term interest rates fell in waves, often linked to crisis events, from approximately eleven percent in 1980 to nil in 1999. Since then Japan remains stuck in a zero interest rate environment (Schnabl 2013) .
A similar scenario emerged in the US under Alan Greenspan with respect to stock markets, as monetary policy tended to respond to bear markets (1987 stock market crash, burst of the dotcom bubble, subprime crisis) while it refrained from intervening in the bull markets of the dotcom or the subprime booms (Hoffmann 2009 ). The key interest rate fell more quickly in recessions than it rose during booms, from more than 18 percent in 1980 to close to nil in 2009.
The EMU experienced a less pronounced development than in Japan or the United
States as the German notion that monetary policy should be solely committed to price stability to some extend prevailed. The institutional framework of the European System of Central
Banks sets an explicit inflation target and -based on the second pillar of the monetary policy strategy -pays attention to monetary aggregates. The growth of money supply M3 far beyond the reference value of 4.5% may have given information that inflationary pressure -in goods or financial markets -had emerged. Yet, the euro area did not remain isolated from foreign monetary trends due to appreciation pressure on the euro, which affected in particular the economic performance of former weak currency countries. During the most recent crisis also euro area interest rate levels declined to a historical low of 0.5 percents accompanied by unconventional monetary policy measures such as outright government bond purchases. 
The Monetary Policy Induced Increase of Public Debt Levels
The structural decline of interest levels which reflects a gradual monetary expansion in the large industrial countries was followed by a growing wave of boom-and-bust cycles as described by Hoffmann and Schnabl (2011a) . Both the boom and the bust periods contributed to a (partially hidden) gradual increase of government debt levels, as politicians around the world exhibited a benign neglect towards the Keynesian postulate of symmetric countercyclical fiscal policies. The gradual rise of government debt in the euro area could not be prevented by the Maastricht rules on fiscal sustainability.
During boom periods, when monetary expansion and financial market exuberance, inflated -often to the surprise of policy makers -tax revenues, policy makers could not resist the temptation to raise expenditure instead of reducing already considerable public debt levels. The pro-cyclical fiscal policy mistakes during increasingly financial market driven upswings had two dimensions. First, politicians did not behave anti-cyclically during the boom, as additional tax revenues were not completely saved and spending was not cut (fiscal policy mistake of type 1).
Second, although the statistical concept of cyclically adjusted fiscal balances existed, the calculation of cyclically adjusted fiscal balances -and thereby the target values for fiscal contraction during booms -did not incorporate the fact that during overinvestment (or speculation) booms tax revenues were inflated beyond the scope of conventional upswings (fiscal policy mistake of type 2). For instance in Ireland and Spain unsustainable financial market and real estate booms made look public budgets sound, although the rising imbalances put the stage for immense upcoming burdens on public finances.
The two types of the fiscal policy mistakes become visible during financial crisis, when the burst of financial or real estate bubbles leads to a sharp decline of tax revenues and to extraordinary expenditures to stabilize financial markets. The consequences of fiscal policy mistakes of type 1 and 2 can be hidden during crisis through monetary expansion as long as interest rates are high enough to embark on monetary expansion. Hoffmann and Schnabl (2011a) dub this phenomenon the "fiscal honeymoon". Yet, when monetary policy rates approach the zero bound public debt levels start to strongly increase as the effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy expansion remains limited. Where -as in the European Monetary Union -debts levels are constrained by institutionalized rules, these rules tend to be abandoned due to extraordinary circumstances.
The hike of public debt levels during crisis in the low interest rate environment has four dimensions. First, the declining effectiveness of monetary policy. Second, the extraordinary need for fiscal stimulus during extraordinary crisis. Third, the lack of anticyclical saving during the boom in the Keynesian sense. Forth, the lack of anti-cyclical public saving in the Hayekian sense, which is linked to the inability of policy makers to spot bubbles and to anticipate the fiscal consequences. Figure 2 shows the resulting structural increase of public debt levels in the large industrial countries, which have reached with the most recent crisis historical peaks in the post-war period. 
The Hysteresis of the Low Interest Rate Trap
Once countries have entered the low interest rate trap and public debt levels continue to increase the situation is likely to persist. The hysteresis of the low interest rate trap is caused by the "fear of structural adjustment" after the boom has turned into bust. The usual adjustment process of the private sector according the monetary and real overinvestment theories of Wickell (1898), Hayek (1929) and Schumpeter (1911) is the dismantling of investment projects which were started, when the interest rate was kept too low for too long and which have turned out unprofitable once credit conditions were tightened.
In the real sector, without policy intervention, enterprises faced by declining demand and declining prices either exit from the market, consolidate their business activities or struggle to survive on a lower level of production. Schumpeter (1911: 360-369 ) regards this "cleansing effect" of recessions as an essential part of a market economy for four reasons (Maurel and Schnabl 2012) : Speculative investment is to be abandoned, inefficient enterprises have to leave the market, the efficiency of the remaining enterprises is strengthened (as wages decline and productivity rises), and new enterprises, products and production processes emerge at the cost of old ones.
To prevent such an adjustment process and the resulting rise in unemployment central banks will tend to keep policy rates low for long. This implies in the low interest rate trap "the persistence of the unadpated and unlivable" (Schumpeter 1911: 367) . The marginal efficiency of private investment will tend to decline, as the allocation function of the interest rate is lost, and (speculative) investment projects with a very low marginal efficiency will persist.
From a financial market perspective, the zero interest rate policy of the central bank provides incentives for commercial banks to postpone the restructuring of the credit portfolio (Schnabl 2013) . Investment projects with a low marginal efficiency will continue to be financed and -as the average marginal efficiency of the financed investment projects declines -commercial banks become more vulnerable to a tightening of monetary conditions. The central bank will feel urged to keep interest rates low to preserve financial stability.
From the government perspective, the pressure on the central bank to keep interest rates low results from the signalling function of the interest rate concerning the soundness of public debt levels. Under free market conditions rising default risk due to rising debt levels is reflected in higher risk premiums. For instance for the current European crisis countries since the turn of the millennium, rising (potential) debt levels would have led to rising risk premiums. Yet expansionary monetary policies, following the burst of the dotcom bubble, compressed the risk premiums on the demand and the supply side of the government bond market. On the supply side buoyant capital inflows into the later crisis economy created the illusion of lasting increases in tax revenues, which stimulated further bond sales. On the demand side, during credit booms the improving macroeconomic performance and rising tax revenues created the illusion of rising debt worthiness of governments.
The upshot is, that in low interest rate trap, after government debt levels have substantially increased, governments will be only able to circumvent painful spending cuts, if the central bank compresses risk premiums on government debt. They do this by keeping interest rates low and by conducting unconventional monetary policy measures such as outright government bond purchases.
During the downward path of interest rates since the early 1980s, central banks provided an incentive to increase government debt levels via a price and an income effect.
The price effect results from reduced financing costs for government debt, which allow increasing debt levels without a major impact on the interest rate burden (as a share of expenditure). During the busts the deleveraging of private agents (due to hiking risk exposure) creates a negative income effect, which urges governments to raise expenditure.
With debt levels increasing, the central bank must keep interest rates low, because of the inversed income and price effects: Rising interest rates would increase the share of the interest rate burden in the public budgets, what would force the government into tax increases or spending cuts. The austerity measures would aggravate the recession, which is unpopular among voters and policy makers. Therefore the most likely outcome is that the fiscal consolidation keeps being postponed preventing the exit from the zero interest rate policies.
The Failure of Monetary Policy Reform
Because the hysteresis of ultra low interest rates and high public debt levels is linked to a loss of the allocation and signalling function of the interest rate, a structural decline of the marginal efficiency of investment, and growing structural distortions in the world economy, reforms of the world monetary system are pressing. The question of how the world can return towards a free market based system with a sound macroeconomic environment can be addressed based on two levels: The exit strategy from ultra low interest rates and high debt as well as the constitution of an alternative world monetary system which impedes central banks of large countries to embark on undue monetary expansion.
The Exit Dilemma
The prevalent institutional monetary policy framework -being based on central bank independence and monetary policy rules -still seems to be widely accepted among policy makers, central bankers and academics. Given this status quo monetary policy reform in a world of central banks would focus on the exit from low interest rate and high debt policies rather than changing the fundament of the world monetary system. The exit from the low interest rate and high debt traps has a macroeconomic policy dimension -which refers to the coordination of the monetary exit with the fiscal exit concerning the timing -and a country dimension -which refers to the monetary policy stance of other countries versus the US as the global monetary hegemon.
The overinvestment theories as discussed above stand for the monetary exit moving first. As decision making, implementation and transmission of fiscal tightening is slow, any approach, which regards fiscal consolidation as a prerequisite for monetary consolidation, would be equivalent to a postponed monetary policy exit. Boom-and-bust cycles, crisis and structural distortions would be perpetuated and the scale of future structural adjustment would increase.
In contrast, by moving timely towards monetary consolidation, i.e. gradually pushing the central bank rate towards the natural interest rate, would create a clear incentive to policy makers to consolidate public expenditure and public debt levels. The reconstitution of the signalling and allocation function of interest rates would turn all current attempts to substitute the signalling function of interest rates by fiscal policy rules redundant. The transatlantic transmission of the non-exit from the low interest rate trap works via the euro/dollar exchange rate, economic heterogeneity and crisis in the euro area. As US monetary policy expands, the euro -ceteris paribus -appreciates. The resulting moderation in inflation opens the door for further monetary expansion in the euro area, while capital inflows from the US and declining interest rates encourage risk taking in financial markets. The multinational ECB decision making body will be inclined to embark on monetary expansion, as the heterogeneity between countries with weak and strong economic performance in the monetary union is amplified.
Global Imbalances and Redistribution as Impediments to Monetary Reform
For this reason the efforts towards monetary policy reform should be focused on a mechanism to control the monetary hegemon against monetary expansion. Hayek (1937: 93) Becouse both goods and capital markets of emerging market economies are less developed than in industrial countries, the absorption capacity for capital inflows and monetary expansion without inflationary and asset market pressure is comparatively low. This has forced the emerging markets at the periphery of the informal dollar standard into relatively restrictive monetary policies -in form of nominal exchange rate stabilization and non-market-based sterilization -and thereby into the financing of US current account deficits (Schnabl and Freitag 2012) .
Similarly, in Europe the divergence of current account balances between Germany and many European periphery countries since the turn of the millennium has been driven by divergent fiscal policy stances (Schnabl and Wollmershäuser, 2013) . Whereas in Germany serious attempts were made to consolidate public finances and the competitiveness of the enterprise sector based on wage austerity, many countries at the periphery of the European This redistribution process from dollar periphery central banks to the US government is not linked to crisis as it takes place among the public sectors with losses being realized by periphery central banks. The upshot is that any move towards monetary reform by the US is equivalent to a move away from the US' exorbitant privilege of providing an international currency, and therefore unlikely at the current point of time. This is in particular the case as US government debt is to a large extent held by foreign rather than by domestic agents.
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This phenomenon is independent from the exchange rate regime (Schnabl and Freitag 2012) . Given fix exchange rates such as in Hong Kong and many oil exporting countries, US monetary expansion is directly translated into domestic monetary expansion. Given more flexible exchange rate regimes, the threat of inflation and asset price bubbles, sterilization costs (which erode central bank independence) or revaluation losses on foreign currency denominated reserves provide an inherent incentive to intervene against appreciation pressure on domestic currencies (Löffler, Schnabl and Schobert 2013 ).
An incentive towards a move of the US towards monetary policy reform could be created by a stability oriented monetary policy stance in Europe, which would enhance the international role of euro and thereby would undermine the widely unchallenged exorbitant privilege to issue the leading international currency. However, also in Europe the move towards a tighter monetary policy stance is unlikely given the current economic instability in the southern part of the euro area. 
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